The ultimate fantasy of any leader spurned is for those who rejected him to someday realize how right he was, and having been the recipient of such a colossal rejection and public shaming, I can only imagine that this is the thought that haunts Donald Rumsfeld every night as he lays in bed, and greets him every morning when he wakes. And while Rumsfeld’s tenure as Secretary of Defense was an abomination, maybe it’s time he be allowed his moment, because it’s become abundantly clear, in the wake of his departure, that the successors of his Iraq War policy have taken this taken a dramatic and potentially disastrous departure — not only from the policies of Rumsfeld — but from the of all American military history to date.
Validation in the eyes of history, however gratifying, comes only after condemnation in the present. So it was for Rumsfeld, that the fleeting glimpses we’ve seen into the inner workings of the Bush administration came more after his departure than before. And while our understanding of the draconian Bush administration will likely remain the poorest in presidential history for decades to come, all of the histories and memoirs to date detail an internal power struggle between a traditional school of combat management represented by Rumsfeld (invade, destroy, get out) and a neoconservative cabal bent on making Iraq into a proving ground for their philosophy of nation building led by Condoleezza Rice. The public history, of course, spells who and what philosophy won. Rumsfeld was dismissed, Rice was not. Any talk of drawdown or troop withdrawal has been replaced with escalation, creatively rebranded as a surge, calls for permanent military bases in Iraq and calls of making Iraq into a “regional watchtower” in language eerily reminiscent of the neoconservative buzzwords that sold the war.
Of course, it all makes sense. Never before in the history of this county have wars been optional, so it should come as no surprise that the architects of this optional war would also view bringing the troops home as optional as well. Never before has the withdrawal of troops from combat been so wantonly viewed by an American president. Of course, Rumsfeld viewed war through the lens of history — accomplishing a mission and returning home. For Rice and the neocons, however, the war is the prelude to the mission, and bringing the troops home is a failure of that mission.
Not in the least bit surprising is the fact that John McCain, the head cheerleader for this hardline approach — more a philosophy than a strategy — would be anointed as the Republican presidential nominee and standard-bearer. He know claims with great pride that it was he who called first for this change in philosophy and realignment of power; away from the only person in the administration working, however incompetently, to bring the troops home and to those who, like McCain, view the withdrawal of troops as inconsequential because it is runs completely contrary to their stated agenda of a permanent military presence in Iraq.
The sad irony of McCain’s involvement in this entire affair, of course, is his history as a prisoner of war, a group noted for it’s courageous motto: Bring them home now, or send us back. Today that motto almost seems like a relic from a time when bringing the troops home was not a position to be derided as defeatism but one of supreme patriotism; a time when supporting perpetual war would never be confused with supporting the troops.
Sen. McCain’s past service to his country as a soldier is unquestionable; it is his current service to that county as a politician that we must discuss, and one, frankly, has little to do with the other. One of the many questions we must consider over the next five months is how could Lt. Commander McCain support Senator McCain? No matter how much politicians idealize combat, and celebrate the spirit of our soldiers — and that spirit is to be celebrated, in ways much less crass than politicians seem capable — the foremost concern of any soldier, before patriotism, before their mission, before their comrades, is an all-surpassing desire to see an end to their combat duty. And while victory and glory and honor certainly figure into their minds, those are the foremost concern of politicians and sons of admirals. But even for a young John McCain and certainly for the enlisted men who account for a majority of combat personnel, how could they support someone who speaks so much of figurative support, and yet offers so little actual support? How can we even imagine the betrayal Roberta McCain would have felt had a presidential candidate told her — while her son was enduring such inhuman treatment in the Hanoi Hilton — that bringing the troops home wasn’t a priority? But perhaps most importantly, where would McCain be if the president during his captivity had viewed talking with our enemies as a sign of weakness, and bringing the troops home as a secondary concern to achieving some ill-defined glory? If Lt. Commander McCain had served under the policies of Sen. McCain, would he be running for president today, or would he be a name on a wall in Washington DC?
